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 Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality?  In a brief, but influential, article 
Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy.  In “Privacy 
v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and 
connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102).   For 
many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, 
notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy might serve feminist objectives, and prove 
consistent with sexual equality.  By arguing that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion rights 
was directly responsible for the weakness and vulnerability of abortion rights in America, 
MacKinnon took aim at feminist hopes for the right to privacy at their strongest point.  
Maintaining that Roe’s privacy justification of abortion is intimately, and not contingently, 
related to the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Harris v. McRae, (1980) MacKinnon 
concluded that privacy rights cannot be reconciled with the freedom and equality of women, and 
so can have no place in a democracy.1 In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the State need not 
provide Medicaid coverage for abortions that are necessary to preserve the health, but not the 
life, of a pregnant woman, effectively depriving poor women of almost all state aid for 
abortions.2  Moreover, the Court’s subsequent decision in Bowers v . Hardwick (1986) appeared 
to confirm the truth of MacKinnon’s observation – though this case concerned gay rights, rather 
than abortion rights, and occurred several years after MacKinnon’s condemnation of Harris.  
 
 This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and 
equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers.  When we contrast the Majority and 
Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to 
privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not.  This is not simply 
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because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike 
the latter, rely on empirical and normative assumptions that would justify sexual inequality 
whatever right they were used to interpret.  So while I agree with MacKinnon that the Majority’s 
interpretation of the right to privacy in Harris is inconsistent with the equality of men and 
women, I show that there is no inherent inconsistency in valuing both privacy and equality, and 
no reason why we must chose to protect the one, rather than the other.  Indeed, an examination of 
MacKinnon’s article, I suggest, can help us to see why rights to privacy can be part of a scheme 
of democratic rights, and how we might go about democratising the right to privacy in future.  
To avoid confusion I should emphasise that my arguments are of a philosophical, not a legal, 
nature.  Thus, I will be ignoring the specifically legal and constitutional aspects of MacKinnon’s 
article, and of the Supreme Court decisions, in order to bring their philosophical significance into 
focus.  
 
MacKinnon's Critique of Privacy 
  
 The First Objection 
 MacKinnon's first objection to the right to privacy is that privacy is the right to be let alone, 
or to be free from state action.  Because privacy gives individuals rights to be let alone by the 
state, she argues, it leaves the powerful free to oppress the vulnerable without fear of state 
scrutiny and accountability.  Though the right to privacy limits the concerted use of state power 
to crush any particular individual, she believes, it promotes individualised forms of oppression.  
Putting her thesis in succinct polemical form, she claims that the right to privacy enables men to 
oppress women one by one. (102) 
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 As MacKinnon notes, liberals believe that the right to privacy is necessary to protect the 
freedom and equality of individuals.(96)  Liberals claim that privacy protects the legitimate 
differences between individuals because it gives them the right to be let alone by the state.  In 
this way, liberals believe, the autonomy of individuals is secured, and individuals are, then, free 
to cooperate together as equals, despite their differences.  MacKinnon, however, believes that 
the case for a right to privacy rests on a basic error.  It presupposes, she argues, that state action 
is the primary threat to the freedom and equality of individuals and ignores the fact that state 
action may be necessary to secure these.3 According to MacKinnon, poverty, different bodily 
powers and the legacy of past inequality can all provide more potent obstacles to individual 
autonomy than state action, and state action could remove or substantially alleviate these.4   
 
 For example, women may be unable to prevent conception and pregnancy though the state 
does not prohibit contraceptive use, because they are ignorant of the relevant biological facts or 
of their right to use contraceptives.  They may be prevented by poverty, youth, geographical 
location and the opposition of others, from using contraceptives even if they want to.  They may 
be discouraged from using contraceptives though they want to prevent pregnancy, because 
contraceptive use has a social meaning which women "did not create" - namely, that one is 
"loose", has no moral standards, is willing to have sexual intercourse with any man.(95)  Because 
women cannot control these interpretations of contraceptive use, and these make it more difficult 
for women successfully to refuse sex with men, MacKinnon notes that women may be unwilling 
to use contraceptives, though otherwise they would do so.  Hence, she maintains, the right to 
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privacy justifies inequality because it assumes that individuals are free and equal when they are 
not. 
 
 Recognising that the state cannot wholly prevent pregnancy from rape or contraceptive 
failure, and that it cannot ensure that men as well as women can become pregnant, MacKinnon 
assumes that the state can, nonetheless, prevent a woman's sexual capacities from becoming the 
source of particular disadvantage and indignity.  The state can shape the circumstances in which 
women conceive, bear children and have abortions, so that these do not, as they now do, 
disadvantage women relative to men.  But this, she believes, the right to privacy prevents, by 
wishing away sexual inequality and coercion.  Far from protecting the freedom and equality of 
individuals, as liberals claim, MacKinnon believes that the right to privacy justifies the 
exploitation and subordination of women by men.  Far from protecting the legitimate differences 
between individuals, she argues, protection for privacy perpetuates illegitimate differences in the 
wellbeing and life prospects of different women.  Hence, she concludes, feminists should reject 
the right to privacy, for all that right means is that "women with privileges get rights". (100) 
 
The Second Objection  
 The association of privacy and intimacy provides the grounds for MacKinnon's second 
objection to the right to privacy.  Whereas her first objection is that privacy rights associate 
freedom and equality with the absence of state regulation, her second objection is that they 
associate freedom and equality with the male-dominated family and with heterosexual intimacy.  
Thus, MacKinnon believes,   
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 "It is probably no coincidence that the very things feminism regards as central to the 
subjection of women - the very place, the body; the very relations, heterosexual; the very 
activities, intercourse and reproduction; the very feelings, intimate - form the core of what is 
covered by privacy doctrine.  From this perspective, the legal concept of privacy can and has 
shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited labor; has preserved the central 
institutions whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition". 
(101, emphasis in text) 
  
 Liberals believe that privacy protects the autonomy and equality of individuals by enabling 
them to form personal associations whose terms they are largely free to regulate for themselves.5   
In this way privacy rights allow individuals to pursue their own good, and to know together 
goods which they could not know alone, to paraphrase Sandel's happy phrase.6  Liberals hope 
that this will give individuals equal access to things which are valuable, but which would be 
devalued or unavailable were choice prohibited.7  For example, mutual care, love, affection and 
friendship, trust and support seem to be fundamental human goods, and ones which depend on 
the voluntary participation of individuals for their being and sustenance.  But because they are 
vulnerable to interference from others, liberals think that the state can only ensure these goods 
for individuals indirectly.  By protecting intimate, sexual and familial relationships by privacy 
rights, then, they hope that the state can protect indirectly what it cannot ensure directly, and can, 
thus, further the happiness as well as the freedom and equality of individuals.  
  
 However, MacKinnon claims, the degree of intimacy has been "the measure of the 
oppression" of women by men (p.100).8  The liberal case for protecting intimate relationships, 
she believes, presumes that the state has no legitimate interest in setting the terms of personal 
associations, or regulating them, in order to exclude exploitative, damaging or unjust 
associations.  It supposes that intimacy precludes exploitation and injustice and, thus, that the 
state has no legitimate interest in regulating the internal relations of intimate associations: 
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"...intimacy is implicitly thought to guarantee symmetry of power.  Injuries arise in violating the 
private sphere, not within and by and because of it". (100) 
  
 These premises, MacKinnon believes, are mistaken, because sexual inequality forces women 
into disadvantageous and exploitative associations with men.  As Okin and others have noted, 
women are expected to marry, to have children and to be their primary caretakers.9  They are 
supposed to devote themselves to the care and fulfillment of others, rather than of themselves. 
Such social expectations shape the treatment and self-images of women from infancy, and shape, 
therefore, their opportunities for learning, work and for personal satisfaction and enjoyment in 
our society.  The result is that women are encouraged to choose a course of life that makes them 
dependent on men for their well-being, and face a wide variety of obstacles to doing otherwise. 
In particular, they face the obstacle presented by men who endorse this perception of women, or 
who resent, fear, or are indifferent to the pursuit of independence by women.10 
  
 Moreover, MacKinnon argues, it is a mistake to believe that intimacy secures the choice and 
well-being of individuals, and thus assures mutuality in relationships.  Intimacy, in itself, need 
not counter-act the egoism, or misperception of the worth of others and oneself, which leads to 
injustice.  On the contrary, it may allow these free play and intensify injustice.(95)11  As both 
Mill and MacKinnon observe, intimacy may increase the pressures on women to behave in ways 
that please or flatter men, or which support their often unconscious sense of what is owed them 
by women, because they are men.(Mill, 1970, 136)  Intimacy with men, in short, may increase 
the pressure on women to be subservient, passive and self-sacrificing, rather than alleviating this 
pressure as liberals expect.  Thus, MacKinnon maintains, "When the law of privacy restricts 
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intrusions into intimacy, it bars changes in control of that intimacy.  The existing distribution of 
power and resources within the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy exists to 
protect".(101) 
  
 So, privacy perpetuates sexual inequality and unfreedom, according to MacKinnon, by hiding 
and justifying oppression because it is intimate and chosen.  By protecting existing forms of 
intimate association, privacy rights suppress legitimate differences between individuals over sex-
roles, the choice of sexual partner, or the conduct of sexual and familial relations.  By 
perpetuating the subordination of women to men in the name of intimacy, privacy rights promote 
"the intimate degradation of women as the public order".(100)  By endorsing oppressive and 
exploitative relationships because individuals commonly accept these, privacy rights militate 
against alternatives.  For they make sexually egalitarian relationships - whether heterosexual or 
homosexual - appear aberrant, unreasonable, perverse.  Thus, privacy rights inhibit and undercut 
the quest for better ways of relating to others, of caring for, and loving them, as equals.  
 
The Third Objection   
 MacKinnon's third reason for believing that privacy is incompatible with equality is that 
privacy rights endorse and maintain the public/private distinction, or the distinction between the 
political and personal.  But this distinction, she claims, is precisely what feminists have had to 
"explode" in order to press their claims for sexual justice (100), because the public/private 
distinction distinguishes the political from the personal in ways that privilege the interests, voices 
and persons of men, over those of women.  Hence, feminists have insisted, the personal is 
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political, in order to show the connection between individual acts of sexual violence and 
exploitation and the way that our society creates and distributes political power.12 
 
 In liberal thought the right to privacy is meant to ensure that the uses of state power are 
determined by impersonal or neutral means.  This, it is thought, is necessary if state power is to 
be justified and compatible with the freedom and equality of individuals.13  By requiring 
individuals to distinguish between the personal and the political, the right to privacy is supposed 
to ensure that the uses of state power are determined by the common interest of citizens, rather 
than by the whims, caprice, and prejudice of the powerful.  By protecting the personal interests 
of citizens from political decision-making, the public/private distinction is supposed to 
encourage fearless participation in public life, even by the relatively powerless or the socially 
unpopular.14  Protection for the right to privacy and the public/private distinction, then, are meant 
to be evidence of a state's commitment to impartiality between the competing interests of 
citizens, and to the freedom and equality of individuals in public and private life.  In this way, 
liberals believe, the public/private distinction can secure the foundations of constitutional 
democracy, and avert the evils of absolute government.  
  
 According to MacKinnon, there are two main difficulties with this picture of the 
public/private distinction.  First, it presupposes that the private is not already political.  Second, it 
presumes that the personal/political distinction is, itself, neutral and impersonal.  Neither, she 
claims, is the case.  So, far from promoting freedom and equality, she thinks, the public/private 
distinction perpetuates sexual inequality and places precisely those beliefs, practices and 
institutions which most contribute to sexual inequality, beyond democratic accountability and 
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redress.  The public/private distinction "is at once an ideological division that lies about women's 
shared experience and that mystifies the unity among the spheres of women's violation.  It is a 
very material division that keeps the private beyond public redress and depoliticises women's 
subjection within it". (102) 
  
 The private is political, MacKinnon argues, because its existence depends on support from 
government, without which there would be no legal protection of privacy.  Moreover, 
government's maintenance of privacy rights is no more politically neutral than its other acts  - for 
example, raising and spending taxes, or regulating   the press and communications media.  In 
each case, the state distributes political power - or the ability to determine how the state is 
governed - by its grant of rights.  In each case, it does so for reasons that are at least as likely to 
be influenced by political calculation - or calculations of what will be advantageous to those with 
power - as by convictions about the justice or goodness of one course of action rather than 
another.15  So, if open and accountable government is meant to protect citizens from the abuse of 
state power by those who have it, we should abandon privacy rights in the interests of democratic 
government.  Absent the belief that the private is not political, MacKinnon argues, the rationale 
for privacy rights advanced by liberals collapses, and privacy can be seen for what it is: a threat 
to the freedom and equality of citizens.  
  
 Moreover, MacKinnon believes, it is untrue that the personal/political distinction is neutral 
between the interests of persons and, therefore, provides an impersonal guide to resolving 
conflicts between them.  What is considered personal is considered   unsuitable for political 
discussion and for collective action.16  But this means that sexual inequality and injustice can be 
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dismissed as a personal matter, as not appropriately political.  Thus, the public/private 
distinction, according to MacKinnon, depoliticises sexual injustice and inequality, leaving its 
victims without effective means for enlisting the help of others in defence of their rights.  Far 
from providing a neutral or impartial standard for resolving conflicts over the uses of state 
power, MacKinnon concludes, the public/private distinction prevents their principled and 
democratic resolution.  It guarantees, she believes, that oppressed and disadvantaged social 
groups will lack impartial judges in those institutions which our society uses to hear, judge and 
redress the grievances of individuals, whether courts, parliaments or public opinion.  Hence, she 
concludes, "To fail to recognize the meaning of the private in the ideology and reality of 
women's subordination by seeking protection behind a right to that privacy is to cut women off 
from collective verification and state support in the same act".(101-2, emphasis in text). 
 
Summary   
  MacKinnon argues, then, that the right to privacy is fundamentally incompatible with the 
freedom and equality of women.  The things that it protects - unaccountability, the male-
dominated heterosexual family, the public/private distinction - are, precisely, those things which 
are responsible for the domination of women by men.  Hence, she claims, it is not accidental that 
Harris justified sexual inequality, nor just bad luck that Roe's privacy justification of abortion 
rights for women had such results.  Rather, she thinks, this is exactly what one would expect.  
Thus, she concludes, Harris fulfills the logic of Roe's privacy perspective on abortion and shows 
us that Roe's claim that women have a right to privacy is, indeed, "an injury got up as a 
gift".(100) 
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THE CRITIQUE OF MACKINNON 
General Remarks  
 These, then, are MacKinnon's reasons for believing privacy rights a threat to sexual 
inequality, and they seem compelling.  For it does look as though privacy rights have justified 
sexual inequality in the ways alleged.  What is less clear, however, is that privacy rights are 
therefore intrinsically and uniquely incompatible with equality, as MacKinnon implies.  From the 
fact that privacy right have justified inequality, for example, it does not follow that they must do 
so, anymore than the justification of undemocratic voting rights shows that equality is 
incompatible with the right to vote.  Indeed, Harris did not claim that state funding for abortion 
rights is inegalitarian or incompatible with the privacy rights of those who oppose abortion.  Nor, 
in fact, does MacKinnon argue that Roe's justification of abortion made state funding for 
abortion impossible.17  As a result, there seems no compelling reason to assimilate Harris to Roe, 
even if one agrees with MacKinnon -   as I do - that Harris justifies sexual inequality.  
  
 Moreover, MacKinnon's critique of the right to privacy is ambiguous in several ways.  She 
shows that our equal right to privacy has justified sexual inequality and concludes that rights to 
privacy must undermine the equality of individuals.  However, her evidence suggests that 
interpretations of the right to privacy which justify sexual inequality depend on dubious premises 
about the equality and rights of individuals.  Get rid of these, Roe suggests, and there is as little 
reason to reject the right to privacy on egalitarian grounds as there is to abandon the right to vote.  
So without denying that Harris and Bowers justify inequality, there seems no reason to condemn 
the right to privacy out of hand, or to conclude, with MacKinnon, that privacy rights are the 
enemy of sexual equality.   
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 In what follows, I will try to substantiate these ideas or hypotheses.  Looking at MacKinnon's 
three objections to the right to privacy, I will show that sexist conceptions of equality and 
inadequate theories of rights both underlie the Majority’s arguments in Harris and Bowers.  
When we recognise the place of these in justifying sexual inequality, I believe, we can 
accommodate MacKinnon's claim that privacy has justified sexual inequality, whilest rejecting 
her conclusion that rights to privacy and equality must conflict. This is possible without 
assuming that moral and legal rights are identical, or that the state can legitimately enforce every 
moral claim by law.  Nor, indeed, is it necessary to suppose that individuals' claims to privacy 
and equality must be obvious, or susceptible to only one interpretation.  Because neither is the 
case, my analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in Harris and Bowers focuses on the 
interpretive principles and assumptions that guide the Majority and Minority conclusions about 
the right to privacy, rather than on those conclusions themselves.  In this way I hope to show that 
on widely accepted assumptions about democratic rights we can reject the decisions in Harris 
and Bowers without rejecting the right to privacy itself.   
 
The Right To Be Let Alone   
 Two arguments are critical to Harris' conclusion that Roe's privacy right to abortion is 
compatible with denying poor women state funding for abortion.18 The first is the claim that the 
government is not responsible for the poverty of poor women.  The second, that the government 
has a duty to remove only those obstacles to the exercise of rights which it, itself, has created.  
Hence, the Majority state:  "Although government may not place obstacles in the path of a 
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woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation, and 
indigency falls within the latter category".(Harris, 298) 
 
 The first claim is certainly contentious and, if rejected, it would seem that the state would 
have a duty to aid poor women, because their right to privacy gives them a right to be let alone 
by the state.  However, I will concentrate on the second claim in Harris.  I do not think that a 
woman's   right to funding for abortion ought to turn on complex, and inevitably contentious, 
questions about the role of the state in causing the poverty of poor women.  But if we accept the 
second claim of the Harris Majority, this is unavoidable.  Moreover, it is this second claim 
which illustrates MacKinnon's contention that the right to privacy justifies inequality because it 
rests on the mistaken premise that individuals would be free and equal if left alone by the state.  
This belief does inform the Harris decision and does justify inequality, as MacKinnon claims.  
However, the right to privacy need not have these results.  The Majority here advance a general 
claim about rights that they then use to interpret the content of the right to privacy.  It is, I 
believe, this thesis about rights that we should reject as inegalitarian and not, as MacKinnon 
thinks, the right to privacy.  
  
 The Majority believe that the constitution requires government to remove only government-
caused obstacles to the exercise of rights, although it permits the government to remove other 
obstacles to individual action.19  Whether or not this claim is correct as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, this thesis about individual rights (and state duties) justifies inequality and seems 
incompatible with a democratic theory of rights.  It supposes that poverty can be an absolute bar 
to the exercise of fundamental rights in cases where the government is not causally responsible 
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for poverty.  Thus, it assumes that the freedom and equality of individuals are adequately 
protected where natural catastrophe, or the results of legitimate third party actions, create 
poverty-based obstacles to the exercise of basic rights - or ones critical to freedom and equality.  
But such a conclusion makes no moral sense, and is hard to reconcile with basic principles of 
right.  After all, if one can effectively be deprived of even fundamental rights through no fault of 
one's own, it is hard to see why we should care about rights, or suppose them necessary to 
protect our freedom and equality.  
 
 That is not to say that the government has a duty to remove poverty-based obstacles to the 
exercise of rights in every case.  Though there are good reasons to believe that poverty threatens 
the freedom and equality of individuals,20 particularly where it coexists alongside great wealth, it 
is not clear that a democratic society must ensure that the poor are capable of exercising all their 
rights, on pain of injustice.  However, in circumstances where it is possible for government to 
remove poverty-caused obstacles to the exercise of fundamental rights, and of doing so without 
threatening the rights of others, it seems that government would have a duty to remove them - by 
subsidising the exercise of those rights and/or by alleviating poverty.  Thus, contrary to the 
Majority's assumption that the State is morally responsible for poverty only where it is causally 
responsible for its existence,21 basic principles of right suggest that the state has a duty to remove 
poverty based constraints on the exercise of fundamental rights so long as it can do so without 
threatening the rights of others.  
  
 There is, therefore, no reason to agree with MacKinnon that the right to privacy must justify 
inequality because it is the right to be left alone by the state, because the Harris principle of state 
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duties would justify inequality whatever right was in question.22  It is hardly surprising then, and 
no mark against the right to privacy, that Harris' interpretation of Roe's privacy right to abortion 
justified sexual inequality, as it does not seem reasonable to agree with the Majority's theory of 
individual rights.  In any case, whether or not one agrees with the Majority, their justification of 
inequality cannot be blamed on the right to privacy.  So, while true that Harris justifies 
inequality and coercion, we need not therefore conclude that equality and the right to privacy 
must conflict.  
 
 In fact, the Harris decision illustrates quite well the reasons for thinking that privacy rights 
can be necessary to protect the freedom and equality of individuals.  According to the Minority,23 
the Hyde Amendment is incompatible with the privacy and equality of poor women, because it 
illegitimately deprives them of personal choice and, thus, fails to protect their equality.  By 
looking at the Minority's objections to the Hyde Amendment, I will show that the right to privacy 
can protect the legitimate differences between individuals, as liberals suppose, and need not, as 
MacKinnon claims, justify inequality amongst them. 
 
 The Minority argue that the Hyde Amendment is incompatible with the privacy of poor 
women.24  The right to privacy, they claim, means that poor women have a right to terminate a 
pregnancy rather than to continue it.  Because the choices a pregnant woman faces are 
dichotomous, if we prevent a woman from terminating a pregnancy, we inevitably force her to 
continue it.  This, the Minority believe, we may not do without violating her right to privacy.  
But this is what the Hyde Amendment does. By denying poor women funding for abortions 
while funding childbirth, the state makes poor women an offer that they cannot well refuse.25  
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Through selectively funding dichotomous options, the Hyde Amendment injects "coercive 
financial incentives favoring childbirth into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to be 
free of governmental intrusion". (Harris, 333)  As a result, the Minority argue, the Hyde 
Amendment deprives indigent women of their freedom to choose abortion over maternity and so 
"imping[es] on the due process liberty right recognised in Roe v. Wade".  
 
 The Minority, then, assert that the state can violate the privacy of poor women by refusing to 
fund abortion. They take issue with the Majority's contention that the Hyde Amendment creates 
no new obstacles to a poor women's reproductive choice, and so does not affect the privacy of 
poor women.26   As the Minority note, the Majority assume that the poverty of poor women is 
itself an absolute bar to reproductive choice, and so believe that the Hyde Amendment does not 
(and, indeed, cannot) deprive poor women of choice.  
  
 According to the Minority, this assumption is false.  Poverty only prevents women from 
having abortions if the state withholds funding for abortion.  It is, therefore, the combination of 
poverty and the Hyde Amendment's selective funding of reproductive choice that forces poor 
women to continue unwanted pregnancies.  Though "Roe and its progeny" do not mean that "the 
State is under an affirmative obligation to ensure access to abortions for all who may desire 
them", the Minority hold that the state has a duty to fund abortions for poor women. (Harris, 
330)27  They believe that Roe prevents the State from "wielding its enormous power and 
influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant woman's freedom to choose whether to 
have an abortion".  Because it violates this requirement, they conclude, the Hyde Amendment is 
incompatible with the privacy of poor women. 
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 Furthermore, the Minority argue, the Hyde Amendment is incompatible with the equality of 
poor women.  There is no reason to believe that poor women have a lesser interest in abortion 
than rich women, or a lesser interest in privacy than men.  But only on these assumptions would 
the Hyde Amendment be compatible with the equality of poor women.  For the principal way in 
which the Hyde Amendment promotes or "encourages" childbirth is by preventing poor women 
who want abortions from exercising their right to abortion, 28 although there is nothing about 
promoting childbirth which justifies such a result.29   Thus, the Minority claim, the means that 
the Hyde Amendment uses to promote childbirth are discriminatory, although the goal of 
promoting childbirth might otherwise be legitimate.30 
  
 So, instead of showing that privacy and equality must conflict, the Hyde Amendment and 
Harris illustrate the reasons for thinking that protection for privacy can be necessary to protect 
the equality of individuals.  Individuals may reasonably differ on matters of fundamental 
importance. Without rights to differ in such matters - rights that we hold against each other and 
against the state - it is hard to see how we can ensure the freedom and equality of individuals.  
Harris and the Hyde Amendment both show that rights to privacy by themselves are insufficient 
to protect the equality of individuals.  Yet that does not show that we have no right to be left 
alone by the state, anymore than it shows that we have no right to equal treatment by law for, in 
their different ways, both the Hyde Amendment and Harris display indifference, and even 
hostility, to the rights of individuals.  This, I believe, is because of, not despite, their indifference 
to legitimate differences in individuals’ needs and beliefs, and their apparent contempt for what 
Roe called a fundamental right - the right to privacy.31  
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The Right Of Personal Choice and Intimacy 
 MacKinnon's second objection to the right to privacy is that it protects the exploitation and 
coercion of women by men, in the name of choice and intimacy.  Thus, she argues, privacy rights 
are incompatible with sexual equality because they protect coercion and exploitation if intimate 
or familial and, in this way, obscure and justify domination.  
  
 MacKinnon appears to believe that there is no way to protect the intimate relations of 
individuals by privacy rights without assuming that heterosexual intimacy is uniquely valuable 
and that the male-dominated heterosexual family is private.  Hence, she supposes, privacy rights 
must protect heterosexual relations, however oppressive, and deny legal protection to 
homosexual associations, however egalitarian.  She seems to assume that the male-dominated 
family must provide the model for defining those intimate relations that privacy rights protect.  
Hence, she assumes that privacy protection for unmarried heterosexual intercourse inevitably 
perpetuates the subordination of women to men within families, although why this should be so 
is unclear.  Similarly, she supposes that the right to privacy cannot be compatible with rights of 
homosexual marriage, family formation and non-marital intercourse.  However, I will argue, 
Blackmun's dissent in Bowers shows that we can distinguish the private from the familial 
through equal rights of intimate association.  
  
 The Majority32 in Bowers  claim that the state may legitimately prohibit consensual adult 
homosexual associations, even if they occur where others need not see them.33  They argue that 
this would be compatible with the privacy and equality of individuals, because the right to 
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privacy is not some broad right to intimate association.  Rather, they maintain, the right to 
privacy protects only certain types of personal decisions, namely, decisions about marriage, 
child- rearing and education, procreation and reproduction. (Bowers, 190-91)  Homosexual 
associations have no clear connection to either of these matters, they claim.  Hence, they 
conclude, laws prohibiting such associations are compatible with the right to privacy and with 
the equality of individuals.  
  
 The argument of the Majority, here, depends on the premise that homosexual associations 
have no connection to matters of family formation or procreation. (Bowers, 191) The Majority do 
not defend this premise and it is a controversial one.  It is far from clear that homosexual 
association must lack a connection to interests in family formation and procreation, although our 
laws prevent homosexual marriage and child- raising.  Hence, if we denied the Majority's 
premise, there would be no need to accept its conclusion that homosexual associations are 
excluded from privacy protection, even on the Majority's definition of the right to privacy. 
 
 But the Majority's account of the right to privacy itself merits critical attention.  The Majority 
present a very narrow account of the right to privacy, one which largely identifies the private 
with the familial.  They fail to explain what unites the diverse content of the right to privacy, as 
they understand it, but appear to assume that rights of reproductive choice can be treated as 
natural extensions of our interests in family formation.  In this way, they assimilate privacy 
protection for the use of contraceptives in non-marital heterosexual intercourse, and for the right 
to abortion, into an existing model of the right to privacy based on the family.34 Hence, the 
Majority's account of the right to privacy treats all legal forms of heterosexual intercourse as 
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though they were directly connected to our interests in family formation, while excluding all 
forms of homosexual association, however committed, from protection by privacy rights.  As a 
result, their account of the right to privacy appears to illustrate MacKinnon's objections to the 
right to privacy, because they divorce our interests in privacy from our interests in equality.  
 
 Whereas the Majority attempt narrowly to circumscribe the right to privacy, while 
incorporating a wide range of heterosexual associations within it, Blackmun's Minority decision 
endorses a more expansive account of the right to privacy.  His reasons for doing so, and his 
account of the connection between intimacy and the right to privacy, I believe, enable us to 
constrain the content of privacy rights in ways that protect the equality of individuals.  For our 
interests in equality are central to Blackmun's account of the right to privacy, whereas they have 
no clear connection to the right to privacy as the Majority present it.  
  
 Blackmun contends that we cannot define the right to privacy in the way that the Majority 
propose.  Instead we must try to establish what unites those things that the right to privacy 
protects and distinguishes them from the things that it excludes.  This the Majority do not do.  
They fail to explain what, in their opinion, makes homosexual associations like incestuous or 
adulterous associations, which privacy rights exclude, rather than like those heterosexual 
associations covered by the right to privacy. (Bowers, 209-10, n.4)  As a result, Blackmun 
contends, the Majority fail to identify the legitimate interests which privacy rights protect.  
Consequently, they arbitrarily deny that consensual adult homosexual associations fall within the 
realm of the right to privacy.  
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 Central to the legitimate interests that privacy rights protect, Blackmun argues, are our 
interests in self-definition and self-determination through intimate and sexual association with 
others. (Bowers, 204-5)  Individuals have, he supposes, a fundamental interest in defining who 
they are and what they cherish, through close personal ties to others.  The choice of companions 
and conduct of our intimate relations are generally important expressions of our identities and 
values, and form an important ingredient of our happiness and well-being.  "'[T]he ability 
independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty'", Blackmun states 
"cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the 'emotional enrichment from close 
ties with others'".35 Hence, he believes, rights of self-definition and self-determination in intimate 
relations form an essential aspect of the right to privacy:  "[The] concept of privacy embodies the 
'moral fact' that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole".36 
 
 Unlike the Majority's, Blackmun's interpretation of our interests in privacy makes room for 
our interests in equality.  By associating our interests in intimacy with our interests in self-
definition and self-determination, Blackmun is able to explain why individuals have an equal 
interest in privacy, and to constrain the right to privacy in ways that support our equality.  Thus, 
Blackmun maintains that the state may prohibit coercive and exploitative relations because 
individuals have an equal interest in determining the nature of their intimate ties to others.37 
However, he claims, this means that the state cannot deny individuals privacy simply because 
some people find their behaviour offensive and immoral.  He argues that "the fact that 
individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships 
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of 
conducting such relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the 
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freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds". 38 
Thus, Blackmun concludes that equal rights to privacy are inconsistent with state-enforced 
conformity to one model of intimate or sexual association.   
  
 By connecting our legitimate interests in privacy to our interests in equality, then, Blackmun 
is able to define the right to privacy in a way that includes consenting adult homosexual 
relations, whilest excluding forms of intimacy which subjugate women. So, if the Minority's 
account of the right to privacy justifies sexual inequality, Blackmun's account of the right to 
privacy show that privacy rights of intimate association can advance our interests in equality. 
  
 In short, a comparison of the Majority and Minority decisions in Bowers, shows that privacy 
rights need not justify sexual inequality.  If assumptions about the privacy of the family have 
often justified inequality, the right to privacy does not depend on such assumptions.  Indeed, 
Blackmun's account of the right to privacy implies that our notions of the familial may need 
considerable revision, because current conceptions of the familial have wrongly denied some 
people privacy and equality. If the Majority sever the connection between our interests in privacy 
and our interests in equality, the Minority reveal the connection between these.  As a result, we 
can reject MacKinnon's second objection to the right to privacy, because rights of personal 
choice and intimate association can advance, and enhance, the equality of individual, rather than 
undermining it.  
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The Public/Private Distinction 
 MacKinnon's third objection to the right to privacy is that this right creates a distinction 
between public and private things, between the political and the personal.  Such distinctions, she 
argues, justify sexual coercion and inequality because they assume that the personal is not 
already political, and that the personal ought not to be political.  As a result, they prevent 
inequality in the private sphere, or in the personal relations of individuals, from being recognised 
as political issues, demanding public redress.  
  
 MacKinnon provides two main reasons why the public/private distinction justifies inequality.  
First, she believes, it leads us to presume that either existing privacy rights or existing political 
rights are just, and on that basis determines how the public/private line should be drawn.  
Second, the distinction leads us to ignore the interdependence of the personal and political and, 
therefore, to naturalise social inequality, or to politicise biological differences.  But the 
public/private distinction need not have these effects and it is, in fact, doubtful that it could 
consistently have both at once.  
  
 As we have seen, there is nothing about valuing privacy which requires us to treat existing 
privacy rights as just, anymore than valuing equality or democracy need commit us to 
overlooking inequality and undemocratic government.  It does not seem that we must ignore the 
interdependence of private and public realms in order to justify inequality.  Nor need we deny 
their distinctness in order to protect the privacy and equality of individuals.  A look at the 
Majority decisions in Harris and Bowers can illustrate these points and, therefore, the difficulties 
of MacKinnon's contentions.  
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 The Majority in both Harris and Bowers relied heavily on claims about the rights of the 
majority of citizens to determine what the state should do.  Hence, they stressed their duty, as 
unelected judges, not themselves to "legislate" by ruling legislation unconstitutional without 
good reason.39 On these grounds, they claimed that the Hyde Amendment and Georgia statute are 
constitutional, because they could not see any compelling reason to consider them incompatible 
with the privacy and equality of individuals.  Far from claiming that the personal is not political, 
or ignoring the fact that the legislature and they, themselves, were determining the content of 
privacy rights, they explicitly recognised these facts in their reasoning, though reaching 
conclusions about justice at odds with those of MacKinnon or the Minority.  
  
 Thus, the Majority's decisions justified inequality because of the way that they thought that 
public and private realms should be distinguished, rather than because they ignored their 
interdependence.  Though ignoring the role of past politics in causing poverty and hostility, the 
Majority are aware that government action shapes the private opportunities of individuals, and 
believe that it may do so legitimately.  Hence, the mere fact of distinguishing public and private 
realms, it seems, does not justify inequality although some ways of making the distinction will 
do so.  
  
 And this seems plausible: because we can still distinguish amongst our rights, even though 
they may be dependent on each other.  For example, the respective content and justification of 
the right to vote and the right to freedom of expression are interdependent.  The content and 
justification of the one, in other words, constrains the content and justification of the other.  Yet, 
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we suppose, individuals should have rights to both.  Though we may find it hard to know how to 
distinguish the two, or to establish where one ends and the other begins, we are not indifferent to 
the need to do so, or agnostic about the appropriate means of doing so.  Thus, we recognise that 
we may need to distinguish between these rights in order to protect them both - as when we 
consider whether or not we can rightly make "hate speech" or pornography crimes.40 And we 
recognise that the reasons for trying to distinguish between the right to vote and the right to 
freedom of expression tell against resolving disputes in such matters by tossing coins or rolling 
dice.  Instead, we generally think, the appropriate way to resolve disputes about the respective 
content of our rights should involve the reasoned consideration of opposing positions, so as to 
minimise, as far as possible, arbitrariness in our protection of individual rights.  
  
 MacKinnon, however, assumes that if public and private realms are interdependent, we 
cannot distinguish between then without justifying inequality.  But, clearly, this supposes that we 
can preserve equality without distinguishing the two, and that interdependence precludes 
reasonable distinctions.  The latter seems mistaken, as rights to vote and to freedom of 
expression can be distinguished, even though they are interdependent, and we can, indeed, 
compare better and worse ways of doing so.  The former seems mistaken as well.  For the fact 
that we support homosexual rights need not commit us to finding our personal happiness in 
homosexual associations, nor imply that the state should mandate homosexual associations for 
everyone.  Such things seem unreasonable and incompatible with equality, for the reasons 
proposed by Blackmun.  So, if we are to protect the freedom and equality of individuals, we will 
have to distinguish the personal from the political, and the personal choices of individuals from 
the collective choices of citizens.  
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Hence, I do not think that we can interpret the feminist claim that the personal is political 
as an objection to all forms of public/private distinction, rather than to particular ways of 
distinguishing the two.41 Otherwise, we will be unable to distinguish the feminist claims from a 
defence of absolute government, or government by whim, personal prejudice and self-interest. 
Though MacKinnon has shown, then, that some ways of drawing the public/private line justify 
inequality, this does not mean that rights to privacy and equality must conflict.  What it shows is 
that undemocratic conceptions of politics and of persons are interdependent, and can be mutually 
supporting.  Some conceptions of persons justify inequality - racist and sexist ones, for example.  
But we cannot do without some distinct conception of persons in determining what justice 
requires, nor without some conception of personal choice.  In short, we need to be able to 
distinguish between individuals and amongst choices, because the interests and choices of one 
are not necessarily those of all.  
 
  Summary  
 A comparison of Majority and Minority decisions in Harris and Bowers, then, suggests that 
feminists need not reject the right to privacy.  Although privacy rights have often justified sexual 
inequality, they have not invariably done so.  Moreover, accounts of the right to privacy that are 
sexually inegalitarian clearly depend on unreasonable assumptions about the equality and rights 
of individuals.  It is, therefore, unreasonable to maintain that rights to privacy and equality must 
conflict, as both of them can, but need not, justify sexual subordination.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 Three general conclusions, I believe, are supported by the evidence that we have examined.  
First, that rights to privacy and equality need not conflict.  Second, that rights to privacy and 
equality are interdependent.  Hence, the meaning and justification of the one must reflect that of 
the other.  Third, that the interdependence of rights to privacy and equality explains why they 
need not conflict.  In what follows, I will explain and clarify these conclusions.  
 
Privacy and Equality 
 In this paper I have argued that rights to privacy and equality need not conflict, although the 
right to privacy can justify inequality.  Thus, I have tried to show, our beliefs about what privacy 
is depend on a variety of factors, more or less normative and empirical.  For example, the 
Majority decision in Harris depends on the claim that government has a duty to remove only 
those obstacles to personal choice that it has created.  Similarly, its decision depended also on the 
assumption that government is not responsible for the poverty of poor women.  If we reject these 
assumptions, there would be no need to conclude that the Hyde Amendment is compatible with 
the privacy rights of poor women.  As a result, the Majority decision in Harris does not support 
MacKinnon's belief that rights to privacy and equality must conflict.  
  
 There are, then, egalitarian conceptions of the right to privacy.  In this, privacy can be 
distinguished from slavery.  It is difficult to reconcile slavery with the equality of individuals.  
Indeed, accounts of slavery which assume that it is compatible with equality seem to rest on 
unreasonable assumptions of fact and value. For example, they assume, with Aristotle, that there 
are natural slaves and natural masters, and that slavery is equally good for both.42 Or they assume 
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that slavery can be consistent with the liberty of individuals, as do Locke and Nozick, although 
supposing absolute government to be unjust and liberty to be valuable.43 So without denying that 
some things which people have valued are fundamentally incompatible with equality, there 
seems no reason to count the right to privacy amongst these.  
  
 This conclusion finds support from MacKinnon's own assumptions about the freedom and 
equality of individuals.  Though arguing that liberal beliefs about freedom and equality are 
inadequate, she treats them as recognisable, if imperfect, accounts of these values.  Similarly, she 
seems to assume that personal choice, intimacy and limits on state action are all potentially 
valuable and compatible with the freedom and equality of individuals. However, given her 
account of privacy, if we revise our conceptions of personal choice, intimacy and the limits of 
state action so that they are compatible with the freedom and equality of individuals, this would 
be to revise our conceptions of the right to privacy.  In short, given MacKinnon's account of the 
distinctive features of the right to privacy, her assumptions about the freedom and equality of 
individuals show that rights to privacy and equality need not conflict.  
  
 Of course, it is possible that MacKinnon has misidentified the right to privacy and, on some 
other account of privacy, rights to privacy and equality will prove incompatible.  After all, one 
might think, there is nothing distinctive to the right to privacy in its protection of personal 
choice, intimacy or limits on state action.  All our rights, it seems, must protect these if they are 
to be compatible with the freedom and equality of individuals.  So, if one wants to isolate the 
distinctive features of the right to privacy that justify inequality - given that any of our rights 
might do so - we cannot identify the right to privacy in the way that MacKinnon proposes.  To do 
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so, we might think, will fail to isolate those factors which lead privacy, like slavery, inevitably to 
justify inequality.  
  
 But though there are difficulties with MacKinnon's account of the right to privacy, this 
objection seems mistaken.  Her account of the right to privacy is not particularly idiosyncratic 
and appears to reflect, and to explain, the reasons why people have thought privacy rights 
incompatible with equality.  Moreover, it has support from established philosophical, legal and 
empirical accounts of privacy and from both the Majority and Minority decisions in Harris and 
Bowers.  Thus it is not clear that there is a better description of the right to privacy which shows 
that privacy and equality must conflict.  
  
 As Marx noted, there is no mystery how slave and serf economic systems perpetuate 
inequality, because the coercion they justify is so manifest.44 Because the coercive aspects of 
capitalism, which perpetuate inequality, are less manifest, he thought that we need to demystify 
capitalism in order to see why it is a morally unacceptable form of social cooperation.  Similarly 
MacKinnon supposes that there would be no mystery about the way in which privacy rights 
justify inequality if individuals did not have equal rights to privacy.  However, because 
individuals have equal rights to privacy, and because privacy looks like a reasonable object of 
equal rights, she thinks that we must demystify the right to privacy in order to understand the 
causes of inequality in our societies.  So, I suspect, there is no better description of the right to 
privacy which shows that privacy and equality must conflict.  Thus, it seems fair to conclude 
from MacKinnon's account of privacy, that the right to privacy need not justify inequality 
although, historically, it has often done so.  
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Interdependence 
 As we have seen, MacKinnon believes that our conception of the nature and value of equality 
depends upon our conception of the right to privacy.  Hence, she argues, we can only have an 
adequate account of the equality of individuals if we reject the right to privacy.  Her views imply 
that, but for the right to privacy, the Supreme Court decisions in Harris and Bowers would have 
had a different outcome.   Hence, so her views suggest, if we look at the reasoning in these cases 
we will find that the right to privacy stopped an otherwise acceptable account of equality in its 
tracks - and that this is why, in Harris and in Bowers, the Majority reached the decisions it did. 
 
 However, I have tried to show, there is no warrant for this interpretation of the Majority 
decisions.  Harris reflects an unreasonable account of the rights of individuals, which would 
itself justify inequality whatever right was in question.  In particular, it provides an unreasonable 
account of the equality of individuals, because it supposes that causal responsibility is a 
prerequisite for moral responsibility – at least in the case of state duties of aid.  Similarly, the 
Majority's decision in Bowers includes an unreasonable account of equality.  It supposes that the 
prejudices of some can justify the use of state power against others.  But if it is wrong to deny 
individuals rights to interracial marriage, because doing so reflects unreasonable beliefs about 
the harm of miscegenation and, plausibly, the inferiority of blacks to whites, then it is similarly 
wrong to deny homosexuals intimacy based on prejudice about sodomy or against homosexuals.  
In each case, one aspect of the harm inflicted on individuals is denial of their equality with 
others, and respect for their moral capacities and agency. 
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 Thus, the Majority decisions reflect the dependence of the right to privacy on our 
conceptions of equality.  They show that our conceptions of equality shape our accounts of the 
content and justification of privacy rights.  Hence, a difficulty with MacKinnon's account of the 
relationship of privacy and equality rights is her assumption that equality depends on privacy, 
but that privacy is not similarly dependent on equality. Bowers and Harris show that privacy and 
equality are interdependent rights, so that assumptions about the content and justification of the 
one reflect assumptions about the other.  Moreover, it is hard to see why our beliefs about 
equality should depend upon our beliefs about privacy, but not vice-versa.  If our values are to be 
reflectively held, our rights to be more than a haphazard conglomeration of particular privileges, 
we ought to be able to revise any one of these in light of the others.  In short, if our values and 
rights are to have reasoned support, rights to privacy and equality must be interdependent.  
 
 In fact, though the conflict thesis appears to assume that our beliefs about the right to privacy 
are wholly independent of our beliefs about equality, this assumption makes it hard to understand 
how liberal beliefs about privacy can justify inequality.  Unless we believed equality valuable, 
there would be no reason to give individuals equal rights to privacy - however valuable we took 
privacy to be.  Unless we believed that equality was compatible with privacy, there would be no 
justification for rights to privacy, if we assumed that individuals should have equal rights.  But it 
is only because the right to privacy justifies inequality, despite equal rights to privacy, that there 
is any reason to suspect that it must be intrinsically inegalitarian.  
 
 It seems mistaken, then, to attribute inegalitarian accounts of the right to privacy to the nature 
of privacy rights.  To do so ignores the role of our theories of rights, and our understanding of 
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equality, in determining the privacy rights of individuals.  This leads to a misleading picture of 
the right to privacy, and a simplistic picture of how privacy rights justify inequality.  It provides 
a misleading image of the right to privacy as some sort of free - floating entity, whose content 
and justification bears no relationship to our beliefs about the equality or rights of individuals.  It 
provides a simplistic account of the ways in which inequality is justified, by obscuring the fact 
that inegalitarian assumptions about the rights and the equality of individuals can, and have, 
justified inequality. 
 
 Interdependence and Conflict 
Finally, I conclude that the interdependence of rights to privacy and equality explains why 
privacy and equality need not conflict. If privacy and equality are interdependent rights, then we 
can revise our accounts of the content and justification of each in light of our best understanding 
of the other.  Though this in itself provides no guarantee that our rights to privacy and equality 
will be democratic, our ability reflectively to revise both provides us with the means to 
accommodate the distinctive value of each in a democratic scheme of individual rights.  
 
  So the Majority's account of the right to privacy justifies the oppression of women, and the 
denial of privacy to homosexual associations, although the Minority's does not.  Nor is this 
"accidental", to use MacKinnon's vocabulary, as the Minority's account of the right to privacy 
reflects our legitimate interests in equality, whereas the Majority's does not.  We can, then, 
embrace the Minority's account of the right to privacy without justifying sexual inequality and 
can reject the conception of privacy and equality implicit in MacKinnon’s thesis.  
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 Rights to privacy and equality, then, need not conflict because they are interdependent, 
as well as distinct, and this point is of practical, as well as theoretical, significance.  Our ability 
to see privacy and equality as rights that share common premises and motivations is a 
precondition for distinguishing democratic from undemocratic versions of each.  Likewise, our 
ability to distinguish the content and justification of rights to privacy and equality is necessary if 
we are to identify the place of each in a democratic system of rights – or, indeed, to understand 
the role that each has had in justifying, and perpetuating, sexual inequality and undemocratic 
government.  In short, because rights to privacy and equality are interdependent as well as 
distinct, we can use our best understanding of each to advance our interpretation of the other, and 
to clarify the role that both might play in a democratic system of rights.  In this way, we can 
make sure that people’s rights to privacy indeed reflect their claims to equality – sexual and 
otherwise – and that the various rights protecting their equality do justice to their claims to 
privacy.  Hence, I conclude, the interdependence of rights to privacy and equality enables us to 
reject the conflict thesis, and to see how we might reconstruct our rights on more democratic 
lines. 
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1 For similar arguments see Law, 1984, 955-1040; Olsen, 1983; and Sunstein, 1992. Following MacKinnon and 
these authors, I will be assuming that sexual equality is a prerequisite for democracy.  
2 In Harris, the Supreme Court was ruling on the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which passed Congress 
in 1976.  The Amendment, in its original form, limited Medicaid funding for abortion only to cases where pregnancy 
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7 See, for example, Schoeman, 1984, pp. 91 and 111-2; Fried, 1968, pp. 475-93. 
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13  Benn and Gauss, eds., 1983, p 40; Rosenblum, 1987, p. 60. 
14 Rosenblum stresses the connection between privacy and participation, pp 61 - 2 "Far from inviting apathy, 
private liberty is supposed to encourage public discussion and the formation of groups that give individuals access to 
wider social contexts and to government." 
15 See, for example, MacKinnon's account of why women got a right to abortion on p.101. 
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16 See Phillips, 1991, pp. 93-4. 
17 The Majority in Harris argue that the state has no duty to fund abortion or childbirth. The implication, then, 
seems to be that the state can legitimately fund neither, either one, or both if it wants to.  See p.316, 318 especially 
footnote 20 quoting Maher.  MacKinnon does not argue that the situation prior to Harris was incompatible with a  
right to privacy.  In fact, in footnote 20, p.249 MacKinnon notes that the right to privacy has been held to include 
funding for abortions under some state constitutions. But MacKinnon fails to explain why, if funding for abortion 
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33  "The fact that homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the home does not affect" the right of the state to 
prohibit such conduct, the Majority claim.  See pp. 195-6 for their argument that Stanley v. Georgia , (1969 ) is not 
applicable to the case, though Stanley protected the possession of pornographic materials in the home that would be 
illegal outside it.  For Brennan's objections to the Majority's interpretation of Stanley as, essentially a First 
Amendment ruling, see pp. 206-7. 
34 For an excellent discussion, see Kaplan, 1997, pp. 43 – 36 and pp. 217 – 224. 
 
35 p. 205. Blackmun is here quoting from Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 1984, p.619. 
36 See p. 204. Here Blackmun cites Stevens' concurring opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 1985) p.777 footnote 5.  There Stevens quoted from Charles Fried, 1977, pp. 288 - 
89.  Charles Fried condemns the Majority decision in Bowers in Fried, 1991, pp. 81-83. 
37 This is suggested by Blackmun's discussion of the limits of privacy rights, footnote 3 pp. 208 - 9, and by his 
objection to the Majority's association of consensual adult homosexual intercourse with the possession of drugs, 
firearms or stolen goods, which are not "[v]ictimless", p.209. 
 38 
38  p. 205.   Emphasis in text.  Blackmun cites Karst, 1980, pp. 624 and 637. 
39  "There should be great resistance to expand the reach of the Due Process Clauses to cover new fundamental 
rights.  Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily would take upon itself further authority to govern the country without 
constitutional authority.  The claimed right in this case falls far short of overcoming this resistance". Bowers, pp. 
186, 194-5. 
40 See, for example, MacKinnon, 1985, pp. 1 - 70; Fiss, 1992, pp. 2041 - 62; Cohen, 1993, pp207-263 
41 Okin, pp. 127-8; Gavison, 1992, pp. 30-35. 
42   in Aristotle, 1988, Book 1, sections 3-7 
43  Locke, 1960, ch. 4; and Nozick, 1974, p.331. 
44 See Marx, 1976, pp. 345-6. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper is a philosophical examination of Catherine MacKinnon’s “Privacy v. Equality: 
Beyond Roe v. Wade” in light of the evidence in Harris v. McRae and Bowers v. Hardwick.  
Though the latter case postdates MacKinnon’s article, MacKinnon’s criticisms of the right to 
privacy appear to find support in this decision, no less than in Harris, which she, herself, cites.  
However, this paper argues, MacKinnon’s reasons for believing that privacy justifies sexual 
inequality do not support the conclusion that all forms of the right to privacy must do so.  Indeed, 
this paper suggests, some forms of privacy are necessary to sexual equality and it is, therefore, 
important to differentiate interpretations of the right to privacy that justify sexual inequality from 
those that do not.  The paper then shows that this is possible, and explains why this is possible, 
by contrasting Majority and Minority interpretations of the right to privacy in these two 
important Supreme Court cases on the right to privacy.  It concludes that while some forms of 
privacy justify sexual inequality, and do so for precisely the reasons that MacKinnon has 
identified, it would be wrong to suppose that privacy rights must justify sexual inequality.  
Hence, privacy rights are like voting rights, rather than the right to own slaves - rights that can be 
interpreted in ways that justify sexual inequality even though protection for both privacy and 
voting may be necessary to sexual equality and, therefore, to democratic government.  
 
 
